Telework, Disability, and the Government We Are Building

 Earlier this spring, I met Hayley Brown at a National Academy of Social Insurance event. I do not know whether she knew who I was or understood my background. It did not seem to matter. She was passionate, credible, and fearless. She spoke her mind and was willing to push back. I found that refreshing. Haley is a bright mind, and the type of person America needs to understand the challenges of Disability, the intersection of labor issues, and improvements to Social Security. The Center for Economic and Policy Research CEPR has a rising leader in their ranks.

Her recent article, "The Trump Administration Is Attacking Federal Workers with Disabilities," brings needed attention to the treatment of disabled federal employees. The central concern deserves to be taken seriously. Telework can determine whether some employees with disabilities can continue serving or must leave federal employment. Federal law requires agencies to consider reasonable accommodations and to treat the federal government as a model employer of people with disabilities (Brown, 2026; Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC], 2026; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203, 2026).

I agree with much of Hayley's argument. Though, I would interpret the administration's actions through a somewhat different lens. I have spent much of my career as an administrator. From that perspective, the issue is larger than telework. It involves workforce restructuring, position design, performance management, public access, and the future of federal labor relations (Office of Personnel Management [OPM], 2025a; White House, 2025b, 2025c).

An Administrator's Lens

An administration has the authority to reorganize agencies and establish workplace expectations. Some jobs require physical presence because employees meet with the public, handle physical materials, use secure systems, or depend on equipment at the worksite. Other duties are portable. Sound administration therefore begins with the mission and the actual work rather than a universal preference for either office work or telework (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2026a; OPM, 2026a; White House, 2025a).

There is also an equity issue inside many agencies. Some employees must report in person because of the duties they perform. For example, SSA is a public contact organization with deep roots of in-person service. Others can complete most of their work from another location. Managers cannot ignore the frustration that develops when flexibility appears arbitrary. Recent OPM guidance calls for consistent performance standards, while GAO recommends evaluating telework against mission outcomes rather than relying on assumptions about work location (GAO, 2025; OPM, n.d.-a).

Start With the Mission

My management philosophy starts with the mission. We must understand the work, adapt to changing conditions, and position people where they can be most effective. The workforce should be fit for purpose. That may mean working in an office, from home, or through a combination of both. Research and federal guidance support evaluating workplace arrangements according to job requirements, organizational outcomes, recruitment, retention, and operating costs (Bloom, Han, & Liang, 2024; GAO, 2025; OPM, 2026a).

The location should follow the work. The work should not be distorted to justify a predetermined location. If a person must meet with the public, handle physical evidence, or access equipment available only in an office, presence matters. If the work is portable and performance can be managed effectively, telework may strengthen recruitment and retention without reducing performance (Bloom et al., 2015; Bloom, Han, & Liang, 2024; GAO, 2026a).

Managers still have to manage performance. Telework does not remove accountability. It makes clear expectations and regular feedback more important. OPM states that teleworkers and non-teleworkers should be held to the same performance standards and evaluated according to the results they produce (OPM, n.d.-a, n.d.-b).

Measure What Matters

Key performance indicators can help. They focus attention on workload, timeliness, quality, and productivity. They can identify a slowing process or a growing need for resources. They can also connect daily work to organizational goals. Performance scholars caution, however, that different management purposes require different measures and that no single indicator can represent the whole organization (Behn, 2003; Kaplan & Norton, 1992; OPM, n.d.-c).

What we measure matters. We do not want or need a “Hanoi Rat Problem“ in Government, a classic example of how a poorly designed incentive can make the original problem worse. In 1902, French colonial officials in Hanoi wanted to reduce the city’s growing rat population, which had been encouraged by the construction of a new sewer system. The government offered residents a bounty for every rat tail they turned in, assuming that each tail represented a dead rat. Instead, people began catching rats, cutting off their tails, and releasing them so they could continue breeding. Some residents reportedly began raising rats or bringing them into the city to collect additional payments. The program produced impressive numbers of submitted tails, but it failed to reduce the rat population and may have increased it.

The lesson is that people respond to the incentives they are given, not necessarily to the result leaders intended. By measuring tails collected rather than the actual decline in rats, officials rewarded activity instead of outcomes. The story is a classic example of Goodhart’s Law, and remains a useful warning for managers who rely too heavily on quotas, production counts, or performance indicators without also measuring quality, accuracy, and whether the underlying problem has actually been solved.

A KPI is an indicator. It is not the work itself, and it is not the whole story. When employees are pressured to hit a number at any cost, the measure can distort the activity it was intended to improve. Public-sector research has documented gaming, target substitution, and the tendency to prioritize measured work over work that is harder to quantify (Hood, 2006; Taylor, 2021).

Managers must understand the work well enough to recognize that difference. They need to know whether a case is delayed because of poor performance or because it is complex. They must distinguish thoughtful review from avoidable delay. Research on public administration emphasizes that frontline public service often requires judgment under conditions of limited time, incomplete information, and competing demands (Lipsky, 2010; Moynihan, 2015).

Some work takes longer than other work. A complicated disability claim cannot always be measured against a simple retirement transaction. A difficult fraud investigation cannot be managed like a routine systems request. Applying the same production target to different types of work may improve a spreadsheet while weakening the underlying service. This is why performance systems should account for complexity, quality, and intended outcomes (Behn, 2003; Moynihan, 2015; National Research Council, 1999).

Accuracy must be measured alongside speed and volume. Customer service, risk, employee development, and case complexity also matter. A balanced set of measures helps managers see results from several perspectives and reduces the risk that one production number will become a substitute for judgment (Kaplan & Norton, 1992; OPM, n.d.-c; GAO, 1995).

Good work also takes a team. An employee may depend on a specialist, attorney, systems expert, supervisor, or another component before a matter can be completed. Research on teamwork identifies leadership, mutual monitoring, backup behavior, adaptability, shared understanding, communication, and trust as important contributors to team performance. A performance system should recognize collaborative work rather than rewarding only the person who closes the transaction (Salas, Sims, & Burke, 2005).

Government is not a factory, though we often mistreat it like one. It is a profession. Federal employees interpret law, evaluate evidence, protect public funds, operate complex systems, and make decisions that affect people's lives. Research on professional organizations and street-level bureaucracy shows why skilled public work often depends on training, discretion, and judgment within a framework of law and accountability (Lipsky, 2010; Mintzberg, 1980).

That does not mean accepting poor performance. It means using measures appropriate to the work. Employees need clear expectations, useful feedback, training, and the tools required to succeed. They should also be held accountable when they do not meet reasonable standards. OPM describes performance management as a continuing process that connects goals, standards, feedback, learning, engagement, and accountability for results (OPM, n.d.-b, n.d.-c). This is hard, difficult work.

Physical presence is not a substitute for this kind of management. An employee can be unproductive at home or in a government office. Research has found that remote and hybrid work can improve performance or retention in some settings without harming measured performance in others. The evidence does not prove that telework is right for every job, but it does undermine the assumption that presence alone establishes productivity (Bloom et al., 2015; Bloom, Han, & Liang, 2024; Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS], 2024).

Restructuring More Than Telework

Telework is only one part of the restructuring now underway. OMB and OPM directed agencies preparing reorganization and reduction-in-force plans to review position descriptions, validate competitive levels, and verify retention information. OPM separately states that position descriptions must remain current when duties, responsibilities, or organizational relationships change (OPM, 2009, 2025a, 2026b).

A position description determines more than an employee's daily tasks. It helps determine occupational series, title, grade, qualifications, and the competitive level used during a reduction in force. It also documents supervisory and organizational relationships that can affect how a position is treated under personnel and labor-relations rules (OPM, 1991, 2009, 2026b).

Position and organizational changes can also affect bargaining-unit status. Federal law excludes supervisors, management officials, confidential employees, and several other categories from bargaining units. OPM guidance on Schedule Policy/Career implementation specifically tells agencies to identify the bargaining-unit status of affected positions. The consequences of a position review can therefore extend beyond classification or grade (Federal Labor Relations Authority [FLRA], n.d.-a; OPM, 2026c).

I do not claim that every rewritten position description is designed to remove someone from a union. Agencies should reassess positions when the work changes. We should still examine the cumulative effect of workforce reductions, revised position structures, exclusions from collective bargaining, and new policy-oriented personnel categories. Together, those actions can reduce both the number of represented employees and the practical reach of collective bargaining (OPM, 2026c; White House, 2025c, 2026).

Public Presence Is Part of the Mission

This matters at Social Security because the agency is reducing its workforce while considering major operational changes. GAO reported in January 2026 that SSA was seeking to substantially reduce the size of its workforce and risked losing mission-critical skills. Members of Congress have also raised concerns about reported plans to reduce field-office visits and consolidate parts of the field structure (GAO, 2026a; Warren et al., 2026).

Agencies with public-contact missions have the most to lose when physical access is reduced without an effective replacement. GAO found continuing gaps in SSA's remote service delivery for vulnerable populations. Research on SSA field-office closures found persistent declines in disability applications and recipients in affected communities, with larger effects among people with lower education and moderately severe conditions (Deshpande & Li, 2019; GAO, 2022, 2026b).

Social Security serves older Americans, people with disabilities, survivors, and families in crisis. Digital service is important, but it does not reach everyone equally. Adults with disabilities remain less likely to own computers and smartphones, and GAO has found that not every claimant can complete an SSI application online. For some members of the public, government must still be a person who listens and helps resolve a complicated problem (GAO, 2026b; Pew Research Center, 2021).

This creates a contradiction in the administration's current approach, an essential inferred component of Haley’s argument. Employees are ordered back into government buildings in the name of accountability and service while the public's access to some offices may be reduced. Filling a building is not the same as maintaining a public presence. An employee can report to a headquarters worksite and still serve the public only by telephone. This is an inference from the return-to-office directive, SSA's workforce reduction plans, and the evidence on the value of field access (Deshpande & Li, 2019; GAO, 2026a; White House, 2025a).

A serious administrative review would begin with the mission. Managers should identify which work requires direct public contact, which work is portable, and how many employees are needed across field offices, telephone service, processing centers, and online operations. GAO's telework framework similarly calls for agencies to establish eligibility, manage performance, collect data, and evaluate effects on mission and service outcomes (GAO, 2025, 2026a).

Accommodation, Arbitration, and Delay

Ordinary telework, fully remote employment, and telework provided as a reasonable accommodation are different things. Federal employees have no general statutory entitlement to telework. Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act and its implementing rules nevertheless require agencies to provide reasonable accommodations and to consider the retention of qualified employees with disabilities (EEOC, 2026; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203, 2026; OPM, n.d.-d).

An employee is not automatically entitled to the exact accommodation requested. An agency may offer another effective accommodation or determine that presence is required to perform an essential function. The decision must follow an individualized assessment. Current EEOC and OPM guidance specifically permits agencies to reevaluate earlier telework accommodations while requiring continued compliance with the Rehabilitation Act (EEOC, 2026; OPM, 2026d).

The administration's return-to-office directive recognizes these limits on paper. It permits exemptions and requires implementation consistent with applicable law. The administrative risk arises when political pressure turns an individualized review into a process with a predetermined answer. EEOC guidance requires agencies to rely on objective information and case-specific assessment when deciding accommodation requests (EEOC, 2005, 2026; White House, 2025a).

Collective bargaining agreements add another layer. In March 2026, an arbitrator found that SSA violated and repudiated its 2019 National Agreement when it stopped telework for covered bargaining-unit employees. The award ordered SSA to restore pre-March 16, 2025 telework levels, cease further violations, and post notice of the violation (Espinosa, 2026).

Unfortunately, an arbitration victory does not always produce an immediate change. SSA announced that it strongly disagreed with the ruling and intended to appeal it to the FLRA. Federal labor law allows either party to file exceptions to an arbitration award within 30 days. The review process can therefore keep the dispute alive after the arbitrator has ruled (FLRA, n.d.-b, n.d.-c; Wagner, 2026).

The practical consequence is that delay can become part of the policy. Employees continue working under the disputed arrangement while the union pursues enforcement or defends an appeal. During that period, some employees may decide to retire or seek other employment. GAO has already identified telework-related retention risks at SSA, making the timing of a remedy an operational concern rather than a purely legal one (GAO, 2026a; Wagner, 2026).

This helps explain why an administration may continue a policy after losing before an arbitrator. The immediate institutional cost of delay may be limited, while the desired workforce changes continue. The agency can still face an enforceable remedy, but accountability is usually directed at the institution rather than the individual officials who made the decision. Political accountability may arrive later, if it arrives at all. This is an interpretation based on the federal arbitration process and the facts reported in the SSA dispute (Espinosa, 2026; FLRA, n.d.-b, n.d.-c; Wagner, 2026).

The Future of Federal Bargaining

The administration's labor strategy is broader than telework. Federal law already reserves major decisions about mission, budget, organization, staffing, assignment, and discipline to management. Unions may bargain over procedures and appropriate arrangements for employees affected by the exercise of those rights. OPM has applied that distinction in its guidance on return-to-office implementation and performance appraisal (FLRA, n.d.-d; OPM, 2025b, 2026e).

At the same time, the administration has excluded large parts of the federal government from federal labor-management relations programs on national-security grounds. OPM has directed affected agencies to change bargaining-unit status codes, and additional personnel changes require agencies to review bargaining-unit coverage. These are documented steps toward a smaller collective-bargaining footprint, even though litigation and administrative review may continue to affect their final reach (OPM, 2026c, 2026f; White House, 2025c).

My broader concern is that these actions will erode national bargaining and leave more disputes to smaller units or local implementation. National agreements create common rules and dispute procedures across large agencies. The FLRA has long recognized nationwide consolidated units, including SSA's, while also recognizing that national units may authorize local components to negotiate supplemental agreements (FLRA, 1980, 1998).

Local bargaining has value because circumstances differ. It is not a full substitute for a functioning national labor relationship. Research on bargaining systems shows that coverage, coordination, level, and organizational strength affect both inclusiveness and bargaining outcomes. Fragmented or decentralized systems may offer flexibility, but they also produce less uniformity and can shift leverage between labor and management (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2019).

If national bargaining weakens, employees doing the same work could face different rules based on their location or local union capacity. Small local organizations may have fewer resources to pursue repeated grievances, arbitration, and litigation. This is a forward-looking concern rather than an established outcome, but it follows from the administration's reduction of bargaining coverage and the known differences between coordinated and decentralized bargaining systems (OECD, 2019; OPM, 2026f; White House, 2025c).

There is also a management cost. National agreements can be slow and frustrating. They can also provide consistency and a known process for implementing change. Weakening that structure does not eliminate conflict. It can move conflict into local disputes, grievances, arbitration, litigation, turnover, and inconsistent implementation. Research on coordinated bargaining emphasizes the need to balance broad standards with flexibility at lower levels (OECD, 2019).

What Kind of Government Are We Building?

Hayley is right to focus on the human cost. I would add the institutional cost. The federal government has invested in recruiting and developing employees with disabilities. When rigid policies push experienced employees out, agencies lose knowledge that is difficult to replace. GAO has warned that SSA faces mission-critical skills gaps while reducing its workforce and restricting telework that employees and managers described as an important retention tool (29 C.F.R. § 1614.203, 2026; GAO, 2026a).

The responsibility of an administrator is to translate political direction into lawful and workable operations. That requires more than compliance with a return-to-office slogan. It requires judgment, adaptation, and an understanding of the work. Federal performance guidance calls for managers to connect individual, team, program, and organizational results to the agency's mission (OPM, n.d.-b, n.d.-c).

Hayley's article provides important pushback. Administrators should test its claims, but they should not dismiss its warning. They should examine accommodation decisions, employee departures, arbitration outcomes, customer access, productivity, accuracy, and service quality. GAO has repeatedly called for agencies to evaluate telework using evidence about mission results rather than relying on unsupported assumptions (Brown, 2026; GAO, 2025, 2026a).

They should also ask what kind of government these changes are building. A smaller workforce may be a legitimate policy goal. A weaker union may be a political goal. Neither guarantees a government that works better for the public. Evidence on SSA's workforce risks, field access, and telework supports evaluating these policies against service outcomes and institutional capacity (Deshpande & Li, 2019; GAO, 2026a, 2026b).

Government is ultimately about people. It is about the employees who perform the work and the public that depends on them. Our responsibility as managers is to put people in the right place, give them the right tools, and measure what matters. An administration may succeed in making government smaller while also making it less capable. The test should be whether the government remains fit for purpose and able to serve the people who still need it (Behn, 2003; GAO, 2026a; OPM, n.d.-c).

 

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