Statement for the Record: Social Security Needs a Commission, but the SSAB Alone Is Not That Commission

 

Dear Chairman Crapo, Ranking Member Wyden, and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement for the record concerning the process Congress should use to address Social Security solvency. I support the Committee's decision to examine process because process is not neutral when Social Security is involved. The process determines who defines the problem, which options receive serious consideration, who writes the first legislative text, and who carries the burden of changing it. I believe the country needs a new bipartisan Social Security commission, and I believe current and former members of the Social Security Advisory Board should participate in it. I do not believe the present four-member Advisory Board should be made the sole architect of a fast-tracked national settlement.

The financing problem is real, and continued delay is not responsible. The 2026 Trustees Report projects that the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund will be depleted in the fourth quarter of 2032, when continuing revenue would cover approximately 78 percent of scheduled retirement and survivor benefits. On a combined basis, the retirement and disability trust funds are projected to be depleted in 2034, when continuing revenue would cover about 83 percent of scheduled benefits. These dates are within the planning horizon of current retirees, near retirees, employers, workers, state governments, and financial markets. Congress should act before approaching depletion turns a difficult negotiation into an emergency.

The PROMISE Act correctly recognizes that Congress needs a structured process, but it gives too much responsibility to too few people under an unreasonable schedule. Introduced on July 14, 2026, S. 4979 would direct the Social Security Advisory Board to develop recommendations and proposed legislative language intended to maintain full scheduled benefits for at least 50 years. The bill requires the Board to submit its report and legislative language by September 14, 2026, after which congressional leaders would introduce the resulting Social Security legislation. It would then establish expedited procedures, including a total limit of 100 hours for consideration and significant restrictions on amendments and procedural motions. A process lasting only weeks is not adequate for legislation that may change taxes, retirement expectations, disability protection, and survivor benefits for generations.

The witnesses appearing before the Committee bring substantial policy and advocacy experience to this discussion. Their views will help explain the financing problem, the available legislative mechanisms, and the concerns of older Americans. The announced panel does not, however, represent the full range of operational and affected-party perspectives that a national commission would require. A commission should hear from policy organizations, but it should also include people who administer Social Security, finance it, receive its benefits, represent claimants, and turn legislation into daily public service. A hearing can gather testimony from those interests, but testimony is not the same as having a seat in the room where provisions are negotiated and approved.

The Social Security Advisory Board was created as part of the legislation that made SSA an independent agency in 1994. It replaced the periodic Social Security Advisory Councils that had been convened to examine trust-fund financing, benefit policy, retirement security, and the relationship between Social Security and other systems. The original organizational work behind the Board expressly contemplated that it would embody the bipartisan tradition of the National Commission on Social Security Reform, institutionalize the quadrennial advisory councils, encourage deliberation, and preserve institutional memory. In that sense, it was intended to be an institutional evolution of the advisory and commission tradition associated with the Greenspan Commission. It was still designed as an advisory body, however, rather than as a permanent substitute for a broadly representative national negotiating commission.

The distinction between an advisory board and a negotiating commission has become increasingly important. The SSAB has produced useful studies and has brought different philosophies into the Social Security debate. Over time, however, its work has often reflected established policy camps and competing partisan arguments rather than the type of negotiated national agreement that Congress now needs. That observation is not a personal criticism of the current members, each of whom brings valuable experience and a legitimate viewpoint. It is a recognition that intellectual diversity among several policy experts is not the same as direct representation of workers, beneficiaries, employers, administrators, and elected officials who must accept responsibility for the final result.

The SSAB is authorized to have seven members, but its website currently lists only four serving members. Four members also constitute the statutory quorum, meaning the Board is operating at the minimum number required to conduct business. The current membership brings experience in congressional policy, disability rights, fiscal economics, technology, business, and Social Security advocacy. Those perspectives should be represented in a commission, but they do not cover the full range of people who would bear the consequences of reform. Four members should not be asked to define the starting point for the most consequential Social Security legislation since 1983.

There is also a serious and unresolved question about the Board's operational independence. The fiscal year 2026 President's Budget proposed reducing the SSAB's $2.7 million operating amount to zero. Reuters had previously reported that the Office of Management and Budget planned to eliminate the Board's funding, an action that would have halted its work even though formally abolishing the Board would require legislation. Congress rejected that request and enacted language in Public Law 119-75 providing that not less than $2.7 million of SSA's administrative funding must be used for the SSAB. Congress therefore protected the Board for fiscal year 2026, but it did not permanently settle the question of how an institution charged with independent review will remain independent from the administration it reviews.

The concern is not limited to one budget cycle. SSA's fiscal year 2027 budget justification again shows an enacted fiscal year 2026 level of $2.7 million for the Board and a fiscal year 2027 President's Budget amount of zero. The administration has therefore repeated its position that the Board should not receive a protected operating allocation, even as Congress is being asked to give the Board extraordinary responsibility for writing Social Security legislation. Congress prevented the immediate defunding, but the attempted defunding remains relevant evidence of the administration's preferred institutional arrangement. A board that must repeatedly fight for its operating existence is not in a secure position to resist political or administrative pressure.

Independence requires more than bipartisan appointment labels. An advisory body cannot function independently if it must rely on the agency or administration it evaluates for employees, contracts, research support, technology, travel, data access, or daily administrative approval. Direct orders are not necessary when control over resources can determine which studies are commissioned, which experts are retained, which information is available, and which work is completed before a statutory deadline. The SSAB's statute contemplates an independent board with its own professional capacity, and Congress should preserve that capacity through stable funding and clear operating authority. An institution assigned to produce the first legislative text should be more independent than an ordinary advisory body, not less independent.

Deputy Commissioner Arjun Mody's background illustrates why the institutional design matters, although it does not establish personal misconduct. Mody serves as SSA's chief operating officer and previously worked on the Trump-Vance transition, led the Senate Republican Conference staff, and advised private clients on legislative strategy, regulatory engagement, crisis management, and public affairs. The public record does not establish that Mody personally designed or authored the proposal to eliminate the SSAB's funding, and that allegation should not be presented as proven fact. His experience does demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of congressional procedure, political messaging, and the use of administrative structures to advance policy goals. Congress should not create a system in which Mody, or any future Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of either party, could influence the work of a supposed independent legislative body through control over resources or operational support.

Senator Bernie Sanders and AARP have identified legitimate dangers in the PROMISE Act's structure. Senator Sanders has warned that the expedited process could provide a path to benefit reductions, privatization, or other changes that would not survive a more open process. AARP has objected to the limits on amendments, the 100-hour cap, and the transfer of substantial agenda-setting authority to an unelected advisory body. Those concerns should not be dismissed as resistance to solvency. They reflect the reality that the person or institution writing the first bill has substantial power over what Congress and the public are later asked to accept.

Opposition to the PROMISE Act should not become opposition to any commission or structured process. Congress has been aware of Social Security's financing problem for decades, yet the gap has continued to grow while the available time has shortened. Regular order alone has not produced a comprehensive solution, and waiting until 2032 will not make Congress more thoughtful or less partisan. The answer is to design a better commission rather than abandon the commission model. A legitimate commission can establish shared facts, narrow the range of choices, build public understanding, and create enough political space for elected officials to act.

The Greenspan Commission provides useful lessons, but those lessons are broader than the existence of a commission bearing a respected chair's name. The National Commission on Social Security Reform had 15 members, with five selected by the President, five through Senate leadership, and five through House leadership. Its membership brought together elected officials, business, organized labor, policy experts, and former Social Security Commissioner Robert Ball, and 12 of its 15 members eventually supported the consensus package. The Commission's recommendations became the basis for congressional action, but the final agreement still required negotiation among President Reagan, Speaker O'Neill, congressional leaders, and Members of Congress. The commission created a place for agreement; it did not relieve elected officials of responsibility for making and defending the agreement.

A new Social Security commission should have approximately 15 to 17 voting members so that it remains workable while representing the interests involved. Its membership should include bipartisan representation from the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee, as well as current or former members of the SSAB. It should include former Senate-confirmed Commissioners and former Acting Commissioners from more than one administration because they understand the difference between legislative theory and operational reality. Organized labor and employers should participate because workers and employers jointly finance the system. Retired workers, survivor beneficiaries, people with disabilities, Supplemental Security Income recipients, younger workers, claimant representatives, state disability determination services, and the SSA career workforce should also have meaningful representation.

The Commission should receive common technical support from the SSA Chief Actuary, the Congressional Budget Office, the Government Accountability Office, the Department of the Treasury, and qualified outside actuaries. Members should begin with a single published baseline so that they cannot select different assumptions whenever the common facts become inconvenient. Each major option should include actuarial results, distributional effects, implementation costs, operational requirements, and effects on current beneficiaries, near retirees, younger workers, employers, women, people with disabilities, and lower-wage workers. The Commission should be allowed enough time to conduct genuine analysis and public engagement, preferably 12 to 18 months rather than several weeks. Public hearings should be held around the country, and the records, models, assumptions, draft options, and dissenting views should be available for public review.

The charge must also be broader than trust-fund arithmetic. The Commission should examine benefit adequacy, payroll-tax revenue, the taxable wage base, retirement-age policy, disability insurance, survivor protections, and the treatment of workers with low or intermittent earnings. It should also examine whether SSA has the staffing, field-office access, telephone capacity, payment-center resources, cybersecurity, data exchanges, and technology required to administer any new law. A reform that produces actuarial balance while making the program harder to access would not be a complete success. Solvency, service, program integrity, modernization, and administrative funding are connected parts of the same national promise.

SSA's operating capacity deserves particular attention because a beneficiary does not experience Social Security as an actuarial table. A widow experiences it when her survivor claim is processed, a retired worker experiences it when the correct payment arrives, and a disabled worker experiences it when evidence is collected and a decision is made. Congress should establish a long-term administrative funding structure that recognizes SSA's responsibilities and protects service capacity from repeated annual erosion. Digital modernization should expand access and give the public more ways to obtain service, not become a reason to close offices or remove human assistance. A financially solvent program that cannot answer the phone, decide a claim, protect personal information, or correct a payment will still lose public trust.

The new commission should have its own appropriation, staff, legal counsel, contracting authority, technology, and administrative support. It should not depend on SSA, the White House, a private advocacy organization, or a single congressional committee for its daily operations. Communications with the administration, congressional offices, advocacy groups, business organizations, labor organizations, and outside financial interests should be disclosed. Meetings should be public except for narrowly limited negotiating sessions, and members should be permitted to publish minority or supplemental reports. These requirements would not eliminate politics, but they would make political influence visible and accountable.

Congress must retain ownership of the result. The Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee should hold public legislative hearings after receiving the Commission's report. Members should have a meaningful opportunity to offer amendments, and major tax or benefit provisions should receive recorded votes. Final legislation should require bipartisan support, but it should not be protected from scrutiny through procedures designed to force acceptance of the Commission's initial text. There should also be no final vote during a lame-duck session in which departing Members determine Social Security policy for the next 50 years.

The Committee should therefore amend or replace the PROMISE Act rather than reject its underlying call for action. Congress should retain the goal of beginning work now, establishing shared facts, obtaining public input, and producing legislative options before the trust funds approach depletion. It should replace the exclusive delegation to the SSAB with a broader and independently funded commission that includes the Board without being limited to the Board. SSAB members deserve seats at the table because of their experience and statutory responsibilities. They should not be asked to constitute the entire table.

Social Security needs a process capable of earning trust from people who begin with different views about taxes, benefits, markets, government, and retirement security. It needs a commission that understands both actuarial financing and the daily work of administering one of the largest institutions in the federal government. It needs open deliberation, common facts, operational expertise, and direct participation by the people affected. Most of all, it needs elected officials willing to own the choices rather than outsource responsibility to an advisory board. Social Security deserves more than a fast process; it deserves a legitimate process that can produce a durable agreement.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement for the record. I urge the Committee to continue its work on a bipartisan process while broadening the representation, strengthening the independence, and improving the transparency of the proposed commission. Congress still has time to act before the financing problem becomes an immediate crisis, but it does not have time to repeat a process that the public will view as predetermined or incomplete. A broad commission can help Congress act, but only Congress can make the final choices and remain accountable for them.

Respectfully submitted,

Leland Dudek

Former Acting Commissioner

Social Security Administration

 

Selected References

1.      U.S. Senate Committee on Finance. Exploring Process Approaches for Addressing Social Security Solvency, full committee hearing scheduled for August 5, 2026.

2.      U.S. Congress. S. 4979, Protecting Retirement Opportunities and Maintaining Income Security for Everyone Act of 2026, introduced July 14, 2026.

3.      Social Security Administration, Office of the Chief Actuary. 2026 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 2026.

4.      Social Security Advisory Board. Authorizing Statute of the Board (Social Security Act section 703; 42 U.S.C. 903), composition, functions, quorum, personnel, and funding authority.

5.      Social Security Advisory Board. Board Members, current membership and biographies.

6.      Social Security Administration. Fiscal Year 2026 Congressional Justification: Limitation on Administrative Expenses, including the FY 2026 President's Budget request for the SSAB.

7.      U.S. Government Publishing Office. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, Public Law 119-75, approved February 3, 2026.

8.      Social Security Administration. Fiscal Year 2027 Congressional Justification, including the FY 2027 President's Budget request for the SSAB.

9.      Reuters. White House wants to defund independent Social Security board, sources say, April 25, 2025.

10.  Social Security Administration. Deputy Commissioner Arjun Mody, official biography.

11.  The Hill. Sanders opposes PROMISE Act, warns of Social Security privatization, 2026.

12.  AARP. 5 Ways AARP Is Fighting for Social Security Right Now, updated June 15, 2026.

13.  Social Security Administration. Report of the National Commission on Social Security Reform (Greenspan Commission), January 1983.

14.  Social Security Administration, Panel on Social Security Organizational Structure. Report on Study of Social Security as an Independent Agency, discussion of the proposed permanent bipartisan advisory board.